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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Definitions: Mother; a female who has borne offspring
Female; of or pertaining to the sex that brings
forth young
Neutered; neither masculine nor feminine in
gender
Gender; the quality of being male or female
B. Mother as Symbol
I use the term "Neutered Mother" because it represents conflict
and contradiction-words in contraposition to each other, incompati-
ble when placed together. The Neutered Mother presents a gendered
noun, degendered by the adjective that precedes it-an opposition of
meaning that mirrors the conflicts in culture and in law over the sig-
nificance and potency of the symbol of Mother.
In this Article, I will assess the evolution of the symbolic aspects
of "Mother" in modem family law reform and offer an argument for
revitalization of the powerful and positive aspects of changes in law
for real life mothers.' Focusing on Mother in any context is danger-
ous. Mother is a universally possessed symbol (although its meaning
may vary across and within cultures). We all have a mother-some
* Maurice T. Moore Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. Mindy
Dutton contributed her talent and energy to this Article.
1. My arguments in this paper are fairly abstract. In earlier work I provided the details
that inform the theoretical stance taken here. I see no need to repeat them, though, when they
are appropriately summarized in the text. For further information on the specifics of family
law reform, see MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991).
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of us are mothers. As a lived experience, Mother is virtually univer-
sally shared in our culture and, therefore, more intimately and
intensely personalized than many other symbols. Mother, however, is
an ambiguous symbol--one about which there is contest. For that
reason, the importance of Mother as a symbol is greatly enhanced on
both an individual and a societal level. In its various configurations,
Mother is a significant factor in defining our understanding of our
own familial, sexual, and social circumstances. In this way, it is also
significant in our construction of universal meanings-defining the
general qualities of life for us.2
In terms of contemporary society, Mother has accumulated neg-
ative as well as positive content. Two major twentieth century con-
tributors to the construction and perpetuation of negative images of
motherhood have been neo-Freudians (very loosely defined) and con-
temporary liberal feminists. These two particular discourses have
been so significant due to the coherency and comprehension of their
articulations of the negative aspects of Mother. These two groups, for
different purposes and in different contexts, have typically constructed
Mother as a problem-laden social and cultural institution. In both
discourses, the symbol of Mother is negatively implicated by the spec-
ter of her dependence on husband and child. In both, she is married
by burdens of obligation and intimacy in an era where personal libera-
tion and individual autonomy are viewed as both mature and essen-
tial. However, the focus of the discourses is different. Neo-Freudians
seem more concerned with the ability of the child to extradite himself
(and I do mean himself) from the clutches of Mother,3 while liberal
feminists are concerned with the ability of women to avoid the psy-
chological and material burdens Mother has placed on them through
the generations.4
2. MURRAY EDELMAN, CONSTRUCTING THE POLITICAL SPECTACLE 8 (1988). While
this particular idea is based on statements in the cited work, I am deeply indebted to Murray's
work in general for educating me about the significance and power of analyzing rhetoric and
symbolism in political thought.
3. See, e.g., NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978);
DOROTHY DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS
AND HUMAN MALAISE (1977); CAROLE KLEIN, MOTHERS AND SONS 121-40 (1984); DAVID
M. LEVY, MATERNAL OVERPROTECTION (1966).
4. The concern with the burdens of motherhood appeared most vividly in the feminist
literature of the 1970's. See, e.g., SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, The Mother, in THE SECOND SEX
586 (1974), where the author extols the popular view among feminists of the day that too
much Mother, that is too much self sacrifice, makes for inferior mothering:
The woman who works... is the one who undergoes pregnancy most easily...
the woman who enjoys the richest individual life will have the most to give her
children and will demand the least from them; she who acquires in effort and
struggle a sense of true human values will be best able to bring them up properly.
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My particular focus in this Article will be on those law reform
activities which are consistent with the stated position of liberal legal
feminists. In their increasingly important role of effecting changes in
law and legal institutions, liberal legal feminists have represented
women's issues and concerns as though they are due in part to pathol-
ogy in the traditional institution of motherhood. The result is that
their rhetoric surrounding issues of potential law reform constantly
reaffirms the notion that Mother must be overcome-refashioned so
that the individual woman is left unencumbered. To a great extent
the law and legal language have begun to incorporate the liberal legal
feminist notion that Mother is an institution which must be
reformed-that is, contained and neutralized. In law, this has been
accomplished through the transfiguration of the symbolically positive
cultural and social components of parenting typically associated with
the institution of motherhood into the degendered components of the
neutered institution of "parenthood."
II. THE LAW OF THE MOTHER
It is important to position the discussion of the neutering or
degendering of Mother within the confines of traditional family law
discourse. Family law is that area of law whereby the state regulates
certain intimate relationships by defining a legal family relationship
and assigning formal legal consequences and obligations within the
context of that definition. Family law both reflects and contributes to
our cultural understandings of the traditional family roles of mother,
father, husband, wife, and child.
A. Early Law
Early and well-defined references to Mother are found in the
To Beauvoir, a "rich individual life" does not consist entirely or even primarily of mothering,
and demanding the least from one's child is an ideal.
More recently there has been a trend in feminist writing not to totally disavow the role of
mother but to simultaneously praise and reject it. Mother is seen as a desirable status at the
same time that it is viewed as a threat to one's personal autonomy. For an illustration of this
ambivalence, see, e.g., NANCY RUBIN, THE MOTHER MIRROR 263 (1984) ("Mother isn't for-
ever. It's a limited altruistic and narcisstic endeavor, albeit one of the most important exper-
iences a woman can have .... Somehow we have to maintain a balance between our feelings
of empathy, devotion, love, and identification with our children without losing the whole of
ourselves to it.").
The idea of Mother as a gendered concept seems particularly threatening and feminists
continue to contribute to the neutering of Mother. See BARBARA K. ROTHMAN, RECREATING
MOTHERHOOD 260 (1989) ("I would like us to get rid of our 'mommy' and 'daddy' language.
We are individuals, in individual relationships with our children, and not the embodiment of
gender-based parental roles.").
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Anglo-American rules regulating custody decisions at divorce.
Mother was clearly designated the "inferior" parent and it was a bat-
tle getting her established in law as a contender with respect to the
custody of her children. Under English common law, fathers had an
absolute right to ownership and control over their children, as if they
held title, and a corresponding duty to support them. Mothers,
according to Blackstone, were entitled to "no power, but only rever-
ence and respect." 5 Early American custody law operated in a rela-
tively simple and straightforward manner. Judicial decisionmaking
was limited to determining if a particular set of circumstances consti-
tuted one of the exceptional cases which required deviation from the
stated standard of father custody and control.
It was not until the latter part of the nineteenth century that the
notion of paternal possession was successfully challenged. Invoking
the powerful cultural Mother imagery of the day, domestically ori-
ented feminists stressed the importance of the mother's special nurtur-
ing and caregiving roles to the welfare of her children.6 This feminist
agitation coupled with the efforts of turn-of-the-century welfare state
do-gooders was instrumental in shifting the focus of custody law
towards concern for the child's right to the best custodial situation,
and away from the property interest of the father.7
The move away from automatic paternal right came with the
adoption of the "best interest of the child" standard as the governing
substantive principle in custody adjudications. Instead of merely
implementing a father's right to custody, the courts were directed to
select the best custodial placement for the child.' The indeterminacy
of this test created problems for the legal system, however, as it
required judges to assess a multitude of factors in making substantive
comparisons and judgments on a case-by-case basis. Many jurisdic-
tions developed subsidiary rules to give coherence (from their per-
spective) and content to the best-interest standard. One such rule was
the presumption in favor of maternal custody based on the belief that
in most instances it would be in a child's best interest to continue to
be nurtured by its mother. This rule became known as the "tender
5. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452. In modern practice, this support
obligation is fulfilled through child support payments without the father having actual physical
custody of the children. JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 61, 233 (1870).
6. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 244-47 (1985).
7. See, e.g., Michael Grossberg, Who Gets the Child? Custody, Guardianship, and the
Rise of a Judicial Patriarchy in Nineteenth-Century America, 9 FEMINIST STUD. 235, 239, 246,
254-55 (1983).
8. For a general description of the development of state supervision of parental duties, see
GROSSBERG, supra note 6, at 289-91.
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years" doctrine. It incorporated the positive symbolic aspects of
Mother, favoring and fostering mother custody, by implementing the
best-interest rule.'
The movement away from the father's absolute right incorpo-
rated the notion of custody as a legal companion to domestic ideology
that recognized a mother's socially productive labor in raising future
citizens. Although the custody rules were predicated on positive per-
ceptions about Mother, they were not problem-free when viewed from
a contemporary feminist perspective. " The revised custody rules
were premised on the middle-class gendered assumptions and asser-
tions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Contempo-
rary norms sanctioned women's exclusion from the public or market
aspects of life under the guise of protecting or sheltering women so
they could fulfill their true roles as bearers and nurturers of the
species.
In addition, even the gains in the family arena for women were
ambiguous. Both social and legal systems conditioned women's
enjoyment of their newly found custodial rights on their submission to
patriarchal norms such as fidelity, temperance, and so on. For that
reason these apparent gains may be better understood as consistent
with the dominant paternalistic rhetoric of the time." While the
wave of domestic feminist ideology that raised Mother as a powerful
symbol initially challenged patriarchy, its more radical implications
were absorbed and deflected, illustrating the elastic nature of
patriarchial ideology.' 2 Individual men had to relinquish some con-
trol over the private or domestic sphere, in that they did not retain an
absolute right to their child's custody, but the basic structures as well
as the ideological underpinnings of the system remained patriarchal.
9. For a discussion of the origins of the tender years doctrine, see Jamil S. Zainaldin, The
Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption and the Courts, 1796-
1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038, 1072-74 (1979).
10. Id. at 237-53; see also Robert J. Levy, Custody Investigation in Divorce Cases, 1985 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 713.
11. This focus on conduct within the context of custody determinations endures in some
jurisdictions today, even though there has been a retreat from fault-based divorce. Some of the
states with express statutory grounds require that denial of custody on the grounds of conduct
be based on a finding that the child is adversely affected by the behavior in question. For data
supporting the proposition that women are treated more harshly than men in such instances,
see Linda K. Girdner, Child Custody Determination: Ideological Dimensions of a Social
Problem, in REDEFINING SOCIAL PROBLEMS, 165, 175-76 (Edward Seidman & Julian
Rappaport eds., 1986).
12. NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW 179-80 (1982); see also Francis E. Olsen,
The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497,
1530-35 (1983). It is also relevant to note that, at this time, there were few divorces,
particularly among middle and upper-class couples, those most likely to be concerned with the
content of family laws.
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Women's role within the private sphere did not alter and codes of
wifely conduct could be enforced through a custody doctrine that
denied deviant mothers custody of their children. Mothers received
custody of young children unless they were "unfit" to provide care for
them. Sexual indiscretions in particular provided grounds upon
which to base a finding of unfitness and to deny mothers custody
under the tender years doctrine. Common bases upon which to estab-
lish unfitness determinations included adultery, cohabitation, and sex-
ual orientation.
In spite of its limitations, this early law of Mother had unrealized
radical potential to empower mothers within the family. Once this
potential was complemented by the economic gains women made dur-
ing the last half of this century, it became apparent that women could
practice motherhood independent of men. This potential necessitated
that Mother be explicitly controlled and reconfined-hence, the direc-
tion of modem reforms in family law.
B. Modern Trends
The maternal preference embodied in the tender years doctrine
stood relatively unchallenged for decades. However, as the incidence
of divorce increased in the early 1970s, so did conflicts over the law
governing child custody determinations. The conflicts were generated
in part by the formation of gendered interest groups with family law
as their focus. For example, stringent state and federal provisions for
the collection of past due child support fostered the formation of
fathers' rights groups which expressed resentment that men were not
equal parents in regard to child custody. To a great extent these
groups represented a backlash to some of the successes of the feminist
movement, such as the impetus to take child support awards
seriously.
The fathers' groups advocated reforms in the family law area
which had as their subtext the perceived inequality in the family law
process.' 3 In efforts to exonerate "deadbeat dads," for example, the
widespread nonpayment of child support was justified by images of
beleaguered fathers victimized by a court system which consistently
awarded mothers custody and treated fathers as nothing more than
"walking wallets."' 4
13. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody and Visitation: Their Relationship to Establishing
and Enforcing Support (1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
14. See, e.g., Michael Raschick, Wisconsin Non-Custodial Parents' Groups (May 16,
1985) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For a discussion of the various
ideological strains within the men's movement, see Michael Shiffman, The Men's Movement:
An Exploratory Empirical Investigation 3, 4 (August 26-30, 1985) (paper prepared for
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Predating the fathers' groups assertion of their interest in achiev-
ing equality within the family, mainstream liberal feminists were
attacking gender-specific legal tests in the public sphere as inherently
discriminatory. They also articulated the ideal of an egalitarian,
genderless family where child care and household responsibilities
were equally shared by husband and wife. The fathers' rights move-
ment picked up on the idea of gender neutrality and turned it to their
rhetorical advantage in the custody area. They effectively criticized
child custody rules and decisionmaking for manifesting what they
perceived to be a "pro-mother" bias.'5 Their attacks seemed all the
more forceful because of the equality reforms that were being imple-
mented in response to the economic consequences of divorce.
Male backlash to family law economic reforms and liberal femi-
nist equality and the gender neutral rhetoric it appropriated helped to
set the stage for challenges to custody rules and processes of decision-
making that relied on the positive aspects of Mother. 6 Both the lib-
eral feminists and the fathers' rights groups undermined the earlier
acceptance of Mother as being something distinct, separate, and, per-
haps, superior to the generic term "parent." Some commentators
even went so far as to assert that gender neutrality requires that con-
siderations of "typically Motherly" characteristics be eliminated from
judicial consideration.' 7 In place of the maternal presumption, cus-
tody arrangements that formally equated parents, such as joint cus-
tody, were proposed and defended on the grounds of furthering
equality between the sexes.' 8
presentation at the 80th Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association,
Washington, D.C.) (draft 2.1 on file with author).
15. See Jay Folberg, Custody Overview, in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 3-10
(Jay Folberg ed., 1984); see also Letter from Neal Skrenes, Secretary, Custodial Parents'
Rights Coalition, Inc., to Wis. Rep. Jeannette Bell, Chair, Special Legislative Committee,
Custody Arrangements (on file with the author).
16. For an analysis of the tender years doctrine under the Equal Protection Clause, see Ex
parte Divine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981), which held that the doctrine constituted
unconstitutional gender discrimination. Most state statutes now specifically provide that both
parents are "equal," thus forbidding consideration of gender in custody cases. See State
Divorce Statutes Chart and Summary Sheet Introduction, FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 5-6 (Mar. 25,
1986). For example, the relevant Wisconsin statute reads: "In making a custody
determination, the court... shall not prefer one potential custodian over the other on the basis
of the sex of the custodian." WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2) (West 1981).
17. See, e.g., William J. Everett, Shared Parenthood in Divorce: The Parental Covenant
and Custody Law, 2 J.L. & REL. 85, 85-89 (1984).
18. Several commentators extended this equality goal to its most extreme limits in their
suggestions that custody disputes be resolved by a toss of the dice. See John Elster, Solomonic
Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987); Robert
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 289-91 (1975).
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Liberal legal feminists, the most obvious potential source for an
articulation of the alternative, non-patriarchal legal discourse about
Mother, seem disinterested in the undertaking, perhaps even in the
subject. Legal feminists have for the most part centered their atten-
tion on non-family circumstances and have expressed ambivalence
about challenging concepts of family relationships except insofar as
they are viewed as hindering or assisting market and economic equal-
ity for women. The existence of women in law, as practitioners,
judges, and teachers, and the fledgling movement among some female
legal academics to develop feminist legal theory have yet to substan-
tially alter the nature of legal discourse or the dominant legal con-
cepts and constructs.
Liberal legal feminists constantly reaffirm their commitment to
gender neutrality in the family context. Gender neutrality is the para-
digmatic expression of the values and norms of the dominant legal
concept of equality which, even if-perhaps, especially if-rephrased
in feminist terms, precludes the consideration of Mother as something
different or distinct from father. In legal texts, statutes, and cases,
Mother is collapsed into the legal generic category of "Parent" and is
suppressed. However, Mother has only disappeared rhetorically. In
social and extra-legal institutions that embody cultural expectations-
idealized and practical-Mother continues to exist and to function. It
is the legal discourse, not society, that is now formally Mother-
purged.
III. A RETURN TO THE LAW OF THE FATHER:
NEUTERING MOTHER
As a result of the push to gender neutrality, Mother as an explic-
itly positive symbol with unique connotations and significance in
regard to her relationship with her child has been moved out of the
text and into the margins of family law discourse. Mother is neutered
into Parent and is, at the same time, transformed into "Wife"-a role
considered to be more appropriate as it connotes an equal or full part-
ner in the family and extra-family contexts. This emphasis on adult
roles and relationships facilitates the tendency to perceive the family
as peripheral to the public arena. The focus in that arena is on
women as economic actors, a role that requires a degree of indepen-
dence that is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the demands
of "traditional" motherhood. Changes in family law will be justified
by the need to refashion Mother, manipulating her to permit the con-
struction of an appropriate egalitarian legal position for women in the
market and public sphere.
(Vol. 46:653
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Furthermore, one consequence of this emphasis has been the
alteration of women's relationship to the market. Women and wives
as equal partners are expected to work-to be self-sufficient and to
assume equal financial responsibility for their children. This is now
true at divorce. However, the implications of neutering Mother are
not confined to custody questions or to the re-ordering of families that
takes place when "private," middle-class families encounter the
divorce system. Liberal legal feminist arguments for gender neutral-
ity and family structuring to facilitate market participation have had
an impact on "public" family law as well. 19 The way we have refash-
ioned Mother has created significant consequences in areas of law and
policymaking outside of the traditional family. It is the neutering of
Mother that has paved the way for acceptance of workfare solutions
to the persistent poverty of many mother-child families in this coun-
try. Requiring single mothers, or any mothers, to engage in market
work or to train for work is viewed as compatible and complementary
to their status as mothers, not in conflict with it.
The liberal feminist valuing of market work for women has been
broadened from its initial conception as an ideal option for middle
class and professional women. The current rhetoric on the appropri-
ate relationship between women and market work establishes it as a
universal and mandatory requirement for all women, mothers or not.
The image of women as independent, economic equals is the mainstay
of public and private family policy. The question that arises, of
course, is what is the harm in that?
Needless to say, the shift in policy has operated to harm the most
disadvantaged and defenseless mothers. The unanticipated byproduct
of earlier liberal feminist attempts to achieve economic equality has
been that the new images of Mother operate to disadvantage many
women encountering the law in the context of nonmarket circum-
stances. Such women are caretakers, nurturers who live lives of
dependency-their child's and their own-which is generated by their
roles as Mother. The institutions with which they have to deal, the
worlds of work and market, are places in which there are no mothers.
Workers are motherless, neither having nor being a mother. The very
gendered and Mothered lives most women live are not accommodated
in the liberal legal concept of gender equality.
The boundary between gender-neutral legal discourse and the
gendered operation of society cannot be maintained. The significance
19. I develop these concepts of "private" and "public" families in Martha A. Fineman,
Intimacy Outside the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 955 (1991); see
also Martha A. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourse, 1991 DUKE L.J. 955.
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of Mother as an institution and cultural symbol continues to have a
shadowed impact on law; it cannot be erased. Equality rhetoric suc-
cessfully employed to neuter Mother as a unique legal construct has
failed to erase Mother on the societal level, nor has it removed the
material manifestations of the institution of Motherhood. The dispar-
ity between the experience of Mother and its neutered legal presenta-
tion is potentially threatening to the maintenance of the legal system's
commitment to gender neutrality. If Mother is and continues to be
experienced as different, legal accomodations for Mother will be
demanded even within a formally neutral family law system.
Women who are Mothers are not well represented in the political
process. It is essential, however, that their perspectives be articulated
in the context of law and policy proposals. Yet liberal feminists have
been reluctant to make Mother a legislative agenda. An overriding
commitment to the equality objective seems to preclude these femi-
nists from conceptualizing and becoming proponents of a gendered
analysis of the policy and politics of families in the United States.
This is an essentially assimilationist stance which does not challenge
existing structures of dominance and control. The liberal legal femi-
nist positition on family reforms, which is exemplified in the paradigm
of gender neutrality, makes it likely that equality will remain the ideo-
logical medium for the construction of legal images-a medium that
threatens further destruction of Mother.
Even if a demand for re-examination of the legal implications of
the institution of motherhood from a feminist perspective were gener-
ated, it is not clear how successful it would be. The nature of law is
conservative. It tends to reformulate, not render obsolete, the core
tenets of our society, and challenges that are too radical or extreme
are typically deflected. In the family context, the basic ideological
construct is patriarchy-a decidedly anti-Mother perspective reflect-
ing power relationships in which pater consistently trumps mater and
the law assists in this endeavor.
IV. THE SEXUAL FAMILY
The reflection of the family presented in family law doctrine may
be distorted or fragmented, but it constitutes a "reality" and forms
the basis for the regulation of actual lives. Because the legally con-
structed image of the family expresses what is appropriately consid-
ered family, it also constitutes the normal and defines the deviant.
The designation of some intimate relationships as deviant legitimates
state intervention and regulation.
Our continued adherence to patriarchy is inevitable given the
[Vol. 46:653
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tenacity and singularity of our prevalent conception of the family as
an institution of horizontal intimacy, based on the romantic sexual
affiliation between a man and a woman. The idealized "nuclear fam-
ily" is a sexual family and its dominance in social and legal thought
has restricted real reform and doomed us to recreate patriarchy.
The basic familial connection in our society is the sexual bond.
For example, one of the central assumptions underpinning our con-
ceptualization of family is that the entity is dependent upon a hetero-
sexual relationship between a man and a woman. 20 This form of
affiliation, romanticized in the glorification of the nuclear family, is
central to traditional family law ideology. Politicians as well as reli-
gious leaders extol this relationship (if it is sanctified) as the core of
the family. 1 While it is true that there is a great deal of emotionally
charged rhetoric directed at children, it seems clear that its primary
focus is on the traditional family model. Under this rhetoric, chil-
dren's problems are created, to a large extent by the fact that they are
trapped in a deviant family situation.
Historically, in order to qualify as the foundational family rela-
tionship, a heterosexual union had to be legally privileged through
marriage. There is a great deal of current agitation to eliminate this
formality. "Liberals" seek to expand the traditional nuclear family
model, urging the recognition of informal heterosexual unions within
the definition of family. There are also calls for acceptance and legal
legitimation of same-sex relationships in the form of proposed domes-
tic partnership laws.
Even in the context of the proposed liberalized definitions of fam-
ily, the adult sexual affiliation remains central. The very existence of
a sexual relationship is what provides the basis for arguing that these
nontraditional unions should be included within the formal legal cate-
gory of family. The form of argument is by analogy. Nontraditional
unions are equated with the paradigmatic relationship of heterosexual
marriage.
Formal, legal, heterosexual marriage continues to dominate our
20. This view was explicitly and forcefully expressed recently in a speech by California
Governor Pete Wilson. Speaking over a chorus of chants protesting his veto of a bill outlawing
employment discrimination against homosexuals, the Governor made a plea for a return to the
values more common in the 1950s-a time he characterized as when the family was cherished
as a "sacred union born from romantic love" and "hard work was rewarded." Daniel M.
Weintraub & Scott Harris, Gay Rights Protest Disrupts Wilson Speech, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 2,
1991, at IA.
21. In a speech explaining his veto of an antidiscrimination-in-employment bill designed to
protect homosexuals, Governor Pete Wilson warned young people against a "headlong rush
into mindless hedonism," and praised "the sacred union born from romantic love." Richard
L. Berke, AIDS Battle Reverting to Us Against Them, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1991, at 4-1.
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imagination when we confront the possibilities of intimacy and fam-
ily. This domination is evident in the language we use to describe the
effect of the end of the relationship through divorce when we speak of
the "broken" family. It is also evident in the way we characterize the
growth of unwed mother-child units as constituting a threat to the
family.
In contrast to the construction of family around a sexual affilia-
tion, a nonsexual construction would not categorize families based on
the relationship of men and women (or its adult members). Instead, it
might begin with the premise that the basic family unit consists of
mother and child. Although this is the family form experienced for
significant time periods by many women and children in our society,
it has never been accepted as a positive ideological or rhetorical alter-
native to the sexual family. A woman and her children "alone" are
considered an incomplete, and thus a deviant unit. They are identified
as a source of pathology, the generators of problems such as poverty
and crime.22
That the relationship between men and women has been at the
core of our perception of family is also evident when we see how it has
defined other family members. For example, the historic characteri-
zation of children as legitimate or illegitimate depended on whether
or not their parents were married. The significant reference in defin-
ing the status of the child was the nature of its parents' relationship.
While such children today are more apt to be labeled "nonmarital,"
the focus is still the same-the child is defined by the relationship
between the parents.
The problem with a notion of family that is culturally and legally
dependent upon the formal (or informal) relationship between adults
is the inevitabile focus on "doing justice" between the adults in public
policy and political discussions. Of course, the conclusion that some-
thing is just heavily depends upon the articulation of the problem and
the context in which any solution is considered. As with all systems
of rules, family law cannot help but reflect society's values and
choices. When codified as legal standards, the privileging of the sex-
22. For a particularly potent example of the persistence of this idea it is illuminating to
trace these assertions of pathology in single parent families over the 20-year period from the
issuance of the Moynihan Report to the 1986 presentation of the problems of the black family
in Bill Moyers' documentary, "The Vanishing Family: Crisis in Black America." See Daniel
P. Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, in THE MOYNIHAN REPORT
AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 41 (Lee Rainwater & William L. Yancey eds., 1967);
The Vanishing Family: Crisis in Black America (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 25, 1986)
(transcript on file at University of Miami Law Review); see also DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN,
FAMILY AND NATION (1986).
[Vol. 46:653
THE NEUTERED MOTHER
ual tie stands as an eloquent, and potentially coercive, statement
about our understanding of the nature of family. Given the contem-
porary hostility between the sexes and the status of equality as the
dominant legal framework for discussions about fairness and justice,
the potential negative effects of this codification are apparent. With
high divorce rates and the organization of women and men into
gendered interest groups when confronted with family issues, we
should not be surprised that assets of the family, including children,
are considered prizes, providing an arena for competition between
women and men when their relationships fail.
In fact, the coalescence of interests along gendered lines is inevi-
table. The family represents the most gendered of our social institu-
tions and this remains true even after decades of an organized
women's movement. While other, nonfamily transformations have
fostered male-female competitiveness, the family is the one area where
tensions generated by perceived changes in the position of women
seem most clearly visible. Historically, the family was the "private
sphere" to which women were assigned in their roles as wife and
mother. In recent decades, more and more women have escaped the
exclusivity of this assignment and theoretically have more options
available now.
To the extent that today's society has developed a system of easy
access to divorce and provided some economic security for women,
women now can combine private and public roles or reject the imposi-
tion of an historically defined role altogether. A woman may choose
both work and family or decide to become a mother without being a
wife. Women can choose to end a marital relationship or never for-
mally establish one, and need not fear that their own or their chil-
dren's futures in such circumstances will involve total
impoverishment and social ostracization. Such changes have not
come without costs, however. Some women feel the changes have
been expensive for all women while benefiting only a few. Others
question whether such changes actually have been advances or
whether they operate to further disadvantage many women. In earlier
work, I asserted that in our response to changing behavior on the part
of women in the evolution of family law, we only reassert, in different
forms, the power men implicitly enjoyed within the context of indis-
solvable marriage and traditional patriarchy.23
While Mother has become potentially empowered by these
changes, patriarchy has not been displaced. And its beneficiaries
(female as well as male) are displeased. Its norm of the male-defined
23. See FINEMAN, supra note 1.
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and male-headed family, with heterosexual union at its core, is
threatened by the changes that have occurred. Consequently, the
desire to contain and undo the reform. Part of the contemporary
attack or backlash, against the changes in women's options is found in
the neutering of Mother evident in contemporary family law rhetoric.
V. THE LEGACY OF THE NEUTERED MOTHER
Consistent with the feminist commitment to gender neutrality,
parenthood, like personhood, has become the preferred designation
because it encompasses both father and Mother without the idealized
distinctions associated with the terms. The desire to have only gen-
der-neutral rules represented an important symbolic component of the
legal feminists' battle to demonstrate that there were no relevant dif-
ferences between the sexes and thus no basis for treating them
unequally in law. Certain feminists even anticipated that the rise of
these egalitarian expectations in language would have concrete effects
on behavior patterns in marriage and divorce situations.
Consistent with the goal of gender neutrality, the legal system
had to eliminate any preferences based on a gendered concept of
Motherhood.24 This had to be accomplished for important symbolic
reasons, regardless of whether a gendered rule accurately conformed
to either intuitive or empirical evidence as to which parent actually
was most likely to systematically and continuously invest time and
effort into child care."
The law's reluctance to recognize and accommodate the unique-
ness of Mothers' role in child rearing conforms to the popular gender-
neutral fetish at the expense of considerations for mothers' material
and psychological circumstances. Even if the ultimate goal is gender
neutrality, the immediate imposition of rules embodying such neutral-
ity within the family law context is disingenuous. The effect is detri-
mental to those who have constructed their lives around gendered
roles. In this regard, reformed divorce laws impose the risk of signifi-
cant emotional as well as economic costs for such Mothers. For
example, shifting custody policy creates an increased threat that
mothers will potentially lose their children at divorce. To Mother,
this risk is too great to contemplate. As a result, many mothers
24. For an extensive discussion of this point regarding the reform of divorce and property
division laws, see Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and
Social Change; A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of
Divorce, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 789, 851, 852.
25. For an illustration of the gap between these reform efforts and reality in contemporary
custody practice, see Girdner, supra note I1, at 174-75.
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exchange a bargained-down property settlement to avoid a custody
contest because they tend, in contrast to fathers, to consider custody a
nonnegotiable issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
As with all symbols about which there is context, some positive
components can be extracted from the negative and neutered con-
struction of Mother. Certainly, the power of Mother is conceded in
the very recognition that it must be contained. The strands for weav-
ing a feminist legal theory of Mother may even hide in the discourse
of patriarchy itself. The question is how to shift contemporary legal
discourse, feminist and otherwise, in such a way as to empower
Mother. Legal discourse, even in its feminist forms and even in the
family law area, continues to be guided by the normative male and
confined by concepts such as equality. To those who believe any rec-
ognition of differences between men and women will inevitably lead to
the designation of an inferior status for women, this is good news.
However, for those who believe that acceptance and accommodation
of differences are necessary (whether they are viewed as essential and
inherent or as socially constructed), the marginalization of Mother in
law and in legal theory is cause for concern.26
One lesson feminists must learn from the neutered Mother is to
be wary of equality. The dominant ideology of equality carries with it
a powerful interpretive history which defines and limits the context
for change. Liberal legal ideology is rarely compatible with different
or "special" treatment. It assumes that the ideal must be equality of
circumstances or at least of opportunity. This legal context has made
it difficult for reform to take into account the persistent, far-reaching,
unequal, and different circumstances that many women experience as
a result of Motherhood and the dependency of children.
Equality ideology may resolve some of the problems revealed by
focusing on the political and public interaction between men and
women. However, this does not mean that it is the inevitable legal
context for the entire endeavor of restructuring the legal position of
women in the family of in their roles as Mother. Within the family,
women are not only wives or partners, but also Mothers, and it is this
26. The opportunity to define the significance of difference should be a welcomed one. The
traditional legal discourse about motherhood exemplified and reinforced patriarchal values-it
was the patriarch who initially defined Mother. Removal of the patriarchal definition is
necessary, but the institution must then be redefined and a non-patriarchal discourse must
replace the discredited one.
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
latter role, in particular, that continues to bear gendered conse-
quences and expectations.
In an earlier work, I argued for the concept of "gendered lives"
in order to legitimate differences based on women's perspective. In a
world in which gender is more than semantics, feminist legal theory
cannot be gender-neutral, nor can it have as its goal equality, in the
traditional, formal, legal sense of that word.27 Addressing the mate-
rial consequences of women's gendered life experiences cannot be
accomplished by a system that refuses to recognize gender as a rele-
vant perspective, thereby imposing "neutral" conclusions on women's
circumstances. Women's existences are constituted by a variety of
experiences-many of them gendered. The potential for reproductive
events such as pregnancy, breast feeding, and abortion certainly have
an impact on women's constructions of their gendered lives.28
This concept of gendered life is my attempt to create a vehicle for
arguing that a concept of differences is necessary to remedy harms to
women. There are totalizing social and legal constructions that do
not conform to our experiences or our needs as mothers. The concept
of a gendered experience is an attempt to simultaneously open a space
for women's perspective in law, as distinct from men's, while provid-
ing the occasion for unity among women over some specifics of their
lives. Attention to the force an imposed-and in that sense, "com-
mon"-socially constructed concept of neutered motherhood exer-
cises upon aspects of all mothers' lives presents an opportunity for
participation by diverse women in resisting that imposition.
Women can coalesce across differences to work together on the
project of defining for ourselves the implications and ramifications of
this gendered aspect of our lives. Women have an interest in the insti-
tution of Mother-how it is understood and given social and legal
significance. Therefore, women have a basis for cooperation and
empathy across their differences. The experience of struggling with
the unreality of the idea of a neutered Mother provides the potential
for this cooperation and empathy.
The recognition that women now face an inappropriately
neutered concept of Mother reaffirms that the struggle over content
and meaning in law is inherently political and that perspectives count.
Any focus on perspectives that asserts as a basic premise that there
27. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State. An Agenda for
Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 535-41 (1982) (discussing feminism as "the theory of women's point of
view" and human sexuality as a gendered experience).
28. Martha A. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of
Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25 (1991).
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are significant differences between women and men which must be
addressed in law is fraught with potential pitfalls. On the other hand,
given that male defined and controlled notions of law systematically
disadvantage women in a variety of contexts, it seems essential that
legal feminists affirm the need for law to respond to what women
experience in their gendered lives. Adopting Mother's perspective
will, of necessity, call into question the very core of patriarchy and
force us to consider how the institution of Motherhood should be
defined.
